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Abstract: Watershed development is an important component of rural development 
and natural resource management strategies in many countries. A watershed is a spe-
cial kind of common pool resource: an area defined by hydrological linkages where 
optimal management requires coordinated use of natural resources by all users. Man-
agement is difficult because watershed systems have multiple, conflicting uses, so 
any given approach will spread benefits and costs unevenly among users. Theories 
from commons research predict great difficulty in managing complex watersheds and 
explain why success has been limited to isolated, actively facilitated microwatershed 
projects with a focus on social organization. Encouraging collective action is easiest 
at the microwatershed level but optimal hydrological management requires working 
at the macrowatershed level. Research suggests potentially severe tradeoffs between 
these two approaches. Resolving the tradeoffs is necessary for widespread success 
in watershed development but solutions are not clear. Examples from India illustrate 
the argument.
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1. Introduction
A watershed or catchment is an area that drains to a common point, and watershed 
development seeks to manage hydrological relationships to optimize the use of natu-
ral resources for conservation, productivity, and poverty alleviation. Achieving this 
requires the coordinated management of multiple resources within a watershed, in-
cluding forests, pastures, agricultural land, surface water and groundwater, all linked 
through hydrology. Watershed development is an important component of many 
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countries’ rural development and natural resource management strategies. The 
World Bank, for example, invested $1.73 billion in watershed development from 
1990-2004 (World Bank 2007), and the Government of India spent over $6 billion 
from 1996-2004 (World Resources Institute 2005). 
This paper introduces critical challenges to making watershed development 
work and presents lessons from research on watersheds and theories about man-
aging the commons. Commons theories do not predict that watershed manage-
ment can be widely successful, and they explain why most projects operate at a 
subvillage microwatershed scale. The paper demonstrates tradeoffs between op-
erating at a small, microwatershed scale to encourage successful collective action 
versus a large, macrowatershed scale that is more suitable from a hydrological 
perspective, and it suggests some lessons for policy and practice. The empirical 
focus is mainly on India but findings are more broadly applicable.
Many watershed resources are characterized by high exclusion costs and sub-
tractability, the two main attributes of common pool resources.1 Many natural re-
sources in a watershed are often held in common, such as pastures, forests, ponds, 
and groundwater. Other resources tend to be managed individually, especially 
agricultural land, but also some patches of pasture, forest, and captured runoff 
water. A watershed is defined, however, by the hydrological linkages among all 
these resources. Collective action among all watershed resource users is needed 
to manage hydrological processes for maximum productivity of the whole wa-
tershed system. Through these hydrological linkages, a watershed system is in 
fact a high exclusion cost, subtractable environmental resource, in other words 
a common pool resource that faces typical commons management problems. In 
complex, multiple use commons like watersheds, interests must be balanced both 
within and across diverse interest groups to generate agreement on regulations 
about resource access, allocation, and control (Steins and Edwards 1999a). 
A watershed is a useful hydrological unit but not a natural unit of human 
social organization (Rhoades 1999; Swallow et al. 2001), and the hydrological 
linkages among different parts of a watershed often are not visible beyond very 
small scales. As a result, self-organization among watershed users is unlikely be-
yond the smallest watersheds, and it is difficult to examine watershed governance 
outside the context of a special project or other effort to promote management.2 
Accordingly, this paper focuses primarily on efforts to promote better watershed 
governance where project investments have tried to strengthen the natural re-
source base.
1
 A high exclusion cost or nonexclusive resource is difficult to exclude others from using. For a 
subtractable or rival resource, one user’s welfare is diminished by other users.
2
 Examples of endogenous watershed management are rare in the literature and invariably concern 
very small watersheds with visible upstream-downstream linkages (e.g. White and Runge 1995, 
Murray 1994).
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It could be argued that upstream-downstream hydrological relationships with-
in watersheds are just externalities3 that can be managed through such approaches 
as Coasian bargaining,4 command-and-control, or taxes and subsidies. However, 
especially in developing country contexts characterized by dense population and 
small holdings, command and control, taxes, and land use restrictions are un-
enforceable (Pagiola et al. 2002). Coasian bargaining is rarely feasible due to 
high transaction costs of generating and enforcing agreement among numerous, 
dispersed actors.5 The nonexclusive nature of watershed hydrology is what makes 
management difficult (Randall 1983).
1.1. Watershed terminology
Watersheds can cover areas of any size, because small watersheds are subsections 
of large watersheds that themselves can be nested within larger watersheds up to 
entire river basins. Attention must be paid to what is being described in any given 
setting. Often microwatershed refers to a small area about the size of a village, 
while macrowatershed refers to something much larger. A casual review of the lit-
erature found discussions of watershed management covering from two hectares 
(White and Runge 1995) to 30,000 hectares (World Bank 2007).
Scale can refer to either hierarchy or magnitude (Swallow et al. 2001). For 
scale as a hierarchy, a watershed is part of a series of hierarchical relationships, 
whereby a small microwatershed is nested within a larger watershed, which in 
turn is nested in an even larger watershed. As a magnitude, scale refers to size, for 
example the number of hectares that a watershed covers or, from a socioeconomic 
perspective, the number of people living in it. On the other hand, watershed agen-
cies refer to ‘scaling up’ their operations meaning to replicate their projects over 
many locations. 
Watershed development and watershed management are often used inter-
changeably. In this paper, watershed development refers to programs with techni-
cal interventions (planting trees, building check dams, etc.) to raise the produc-
tivity of certain resources and bring water resources under control. Watershed 
management refers to managing hydrological relationships in a watershed, which 
may involve protecting certain resources from degradation rather than making 
physical investments in their productivity. Technical interventions are likely to be 
fruitless without subsequent management. Watershed governance refers to insti-
tutional arrangements to guide management.
3
 Externalities are unreimbursed costs or uncharged benefits accruing to people resulting from 
someone else’s actions.
4
 Coasian bargaining is negotiation among affected parties to resolve an externality in a mutually 
acceptable way, conditional on the cost of the solution being less than that of the problem itself.
5
 Coasian bargaining cannot work when there are high transaction costs associated with generating 
and enforcing agreement among a large number of actors. If a watershed had only a single occupant 
there would be no externality. With only an upstream occupant and a downstream occupant, Coa-
sian bargaining would be straightforward. However, transaction costs increase exponentially with 
each additional independent actor. 
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Watershed projects have different objectives depending on the perceived natu-
ral resource management problem in a given area. In the United States, watershed 
management is mainly about protecting water quality. In many areas it is about 
flood control. In hilly, semi-arid areas of India, the focus is on water harvesting, or 
trapping runoff during the rainy season for later use when water is scarce. In flat-
ter areas with less opportunity for water harvesting, it is more about concentrating 
soil moisture to raise rainfed agricultural productivity. In virtually all watershed 
projects, soil conservation is either a specific objective or a means of achieving 
another objective. This paper focuses primarily on projects that harvest water and 
concentrate moisture, which are widespread in areas with seasonal water scar-
city.
2. What watershed projects aim to achieve
Watershed projects in developing countries that focus on water harvesting and 
soil conservation typically state three objectives: 1) conserve and strengthen the 
natural resource base, 2) make agriculture and other natural resource-based activi-
ties more productive, and 3) support rural livelihoods to alleviate poverty. The 
first objective builds the foundation for the second, which in turn supports the 
third. 
In seasonally dry areas where watershed projects focus on water harvesting, 
the natural resource base in question typically includes soil, water, agricultural 
land, pastures, and forests. Surface water bodies may also support small fisheries. 
Steps to strengthen one of these natural resources inevitably affect others and the 
livelihoods that depend on them. Watershed projects typically begin by investing 
in soil conservation in the upper watershed. Upper watersheds often are hilly, with 
pasture or forest land use rather than agriculture. In such cases, soil conservation 
typically involves increasing vegetative cover since bare ground is more prone 
to erosion. This involves planting new vegetation and making the area off-limits 
to grazing animals. Water harvesting involves building small dams to capture 
runoff from upper watersheds after heavy rains. Reducing erosion reduces silt in 
runoff water and in water harvesting ponds, thus lengthening their lifespan. Water 
harvesting in turn benefits farms further down the slope by providing irrigation, 
either via surface water or by recharging groundwater.
These interventions are designed to eventually raise the productivity of all 
natural resources in the watershed. Soil becomes more productive for agriculture, 
water is captured for irrigation, and pastures and forests yield more biomass. All 
livelihood activities that depend on these resources may be enhanced, and em-
ployment may increase as agriculture becomes more productive and additional 
labor is needed for harvesting and other operations. One important point is that 
improvements in different natural resources have different durations. Water har-
vesting for example can begin almost immediately but forests and pastures take 
time to yield increased biomass, and they are off limits to grazing and harvesting 
during revegetation.
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Spectacular benefits have been documented in well-known watershed projects 
in India. In Sukhomajri in Haryana state, the entire village ecosystem and econ-
omy were transformed through protection of common lands and irrigation. The 
common areas became a lush, valuable forest, and stall-fed buffaloes and cross-
bred cows almost entirely replaced goats, turning the village into a major seller of 
milk. These changes resulted in a sharp rise in incomes, with all households gain-
ing (Kerr 2002). In Ralegaon Siddhi, Maharashtra, irrigated area rose from 0 to 70 
percent through water harvesting and transformed the village economy. Nearby, 
under the Indo-German Watershed Development Project, irrigation raised labor 
demand such that within four years, laborers in one village indicated that they 
could find 9-10 months of employment compared to only 3-4 before the project 
(World Resources Institute 2005).
2.1. Socioeconomic Challenges to Successful Watershed Development
Various challenges make watershed management more complicated than suggest-
ed by the glossy statistics from successful projects, which have raised unrealistic 
expectations of what can be achieved widely. Many success stories, for example, 
are found in hilly, bowl-shaped microwatersheds with very favorable conditions 
for water harvesting. In more typical cases, benefits are incremental and gradual. 
With a less visible connection between investments made and benefits realized, 
organizational challenges become more apparent (Kerr 2002).
One of the biggest challenges to watershed management is that its costs and 
benefits are distributed unevenly, yet cooperation is required to make it work. 
Uneven impacts result from spatial variation and multiple, conflicting uses of 
natural resources. The conflict between using upper watersheds for grazing and 
protecting them for regeneration to support downstream irrigation is a good ex-
ample. If the benefits are large and quickly maturing, those who lose in the short 
term may be willing to wait for gains, and devising mechanisms to diffuse costs 
may be manageable. But this is more difficult in the majority of cases where ben-
efits are gradual and incremental. Even in higher rainfall areas of India vegetative 
regeneration takes about three years – too long to ask poor people to refrain from 
using resources they need.
Accordingly, watershed projects need to create mechanisms to encourage 
natural resource utilization consistent with the common good. After the failure of 
early projects that focused only on technology, beginning about 1990 they more 
commonly incorporated efforts to promote watershed governance to share net 
benefits. This is a simpler task in village-level microwatersheds with discernable 
hydrological linkages and established social relationships than in macrowater-
sheds spanning multiple villages.
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2.2. Technical Challenges to Successful Watershed Development
In India, recent hydrological research suggests that watershed projects may be 
exacerbating precisely the water shortages they aim to overcome. At the macro-
watershed level (covering many villages), Batchelor et al. (2003) document cases 
where water harvesting in upper watersheds reduced water availability down-
stream. Calder et al. (2006) refers to this as ‘catchment closure,’ whereby water 
harvesting upstream concentrates groundwater locally and then intensive pump-
ing exhausts the shallow aquifer. In this case watershed development prevents 
both surface runoff and groundwater from moving naturally downstream. It sug-
gests two perverse project outcomes: first, what is good for one microwatershed 
can be bad for others downstream, and second, what is good for a watershed in the 
short term can be bad in the long term.6
Recent literature presents additional cases detailing inaccurate understanding 
of technical relationships in watersheds. One example is faulty assumptions re-
garding the role of trees in watershed hydrology. All over India and elsewhere, 
trees are planted in watershed projects with the stated objective of promoting 
groundwater recharge. A motto of the Tamil Nadu Forest Department is ‘Save 
Trees to Save Water.’ However, most trees have precisely the opposite function 
because they are net consumers of water (Calder 2002). Similarly, soil scien-
tists long estimated landscape-wide erosion rates by extrapolating upward from 
experimental erosion plots, as if all land in a watershed eroded at the same rate 
and all eroding soil disappeared entirely from the watershed. More recent evi-
dence shows that due to filters in the landscape, most eroding soil simply moves 
from one part of a watershed to another (e.g. Swallow et al. 2001). Some farm-
ers actually benefit from soil erosion through silt deposition on their land and 
even actively encourage erosion to move soil to where it can be most productive 
(Chambers 1990).
Uncertainty and misunderstanding about technical watershed relationships, 
combined with the uneven distribution of benefits and costs of management, cre-
ate severe challenges to managing watersheds. This raises questions about what 
really can be expected of watershed development as a strategy for transforming 
rural natural resources and livelihoods. Rhoades (1999) raised this question re-
garding participatory watershed approaches and discussed many of the challenges 
listed here. He suggested the need for more empirical analysis of whether par-
ticipatory approaches can really be replicated widely, and he argued that project 
workers need better science, better methods, and better organizational skills along 
with donor money and patience. As discussed below, to date there have been more 
evaluations but most participatory approaches still operate in small microwater-
6
 The absence of measures to manage groundwater demand contributes to this problem in India. 
Electricity to run pumps is free in some states and subject to a low, flat fee in others, allowing pump 
owners to draw unlimited water without affecting their costs. In addition, whoever pumps water first 
owns it (Singh 1992) and this encourages overpumping.
95Watershed Management: Lessons from Common Property Theory 
sheds. Most evaluations still cover the small success stories and it remains unclear 
whether watershed management can succeed beyond a few small exceptions.
3. Common property theory and watershed management
Can watershed management achieve the triple objectives of improved natural 
resource conservation, higher agricultural productivity, and poverty alleviation? 
We know this is so in some cases, but can it succeed widely? Under what condi-
tions can it overcome the problem of uneven distribution of costs and benefits in 
the face of poorly understood, often invisible hydrological linkages? Theories 
about determinants of successful commons management may provide insights 
into this question.
3.1. Enabling conditions for successful management of the commons 
There is a long line of literature on conditions that encourage successful commons 
management. Wade (1988) and Ostrom (1990) offered sets of favorable condi-
tions, and Baland and Platteau (1996) updated them. Agrawal (2001) synthesized 
and revised these factors, focusing on those that enable sustainable governance of 
the commons. For watershed projects, the key issue is a group’s ability to estab-
lish a new governance system to effectively manage the watershed commons. 
Table 1 presents a list of factors associated with emergence of self-governance 
of the commons. It draws on Agrawal’s (2001) synthesis but includes only those 
factors likely to be important for establishing a new, successful management sys-
tem. Additional factors draw from Ostrom (1999), who distinguished between 
design principles of long-lived management systems and factors conducive to 
emergence of new systems. Many factors in Agrawal’s synthesis draw from Wade 
(1988), and Baland and Platteau (1996). 
Watershed characteristics correspond poorly to the list of enabling condi-
tions in table 1. This provides many clues about why watersheds are difficult to 
manage and why projects might work better in a village-based microwatershed 
than a much larger area. Beginning with resource characteristics, eight favorable 
attributes are listed: small size, well-defined boundaries, low mobility, possible 
storage of benefits, predictability, feasibility of improving the resource, traceabil-
ity of benefits to a management intervention, and availability of indicators of the 
resource condition. Almost all of these attributes present problems because they 
rarely characterize watershed management. For example, invisible boundaries, 
mobility of groundwater and surface water, unpredictability and infeasibility of 
improvement, and lack of traceability all pose challenges to collective action in 
many watershed cases. Even where some of these conditions are more favorable, 
mobility of water leads to an uneven distribution of benefits and costs, which 
raises major challenges. It is important to note that problems of mobility, clar-
ity of boundaries, and traceability apply regardless of the scale but are mitigated 
somewhat in smaller watersheds.
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Group characteristics include small size, clearly defined boundaries, shared 
norms, trust, past successful experiences, appropriate leadership, interdependence 
among group members, heterogeneity of endowments but homogeneity of inter-
ests, and low levels of poverty. All of these attributes except poverty point to the 
advantages of working in a watershed no larger than a village, because most of 
these characteristics will not be found among multi-village groups. Homogene-
ity of interests will be difficult to achieve in most watersheds due to conflicting 
uses of shared water resources and upstream-downstream differences in interests. 
Likewise, some watershed uses are dependent on others but dependence is not 
always mutual, therefore the condition of interdependence may not hold. Regard-
ing poverty, working at a small scale makes it feasible to systematically exclude 
areas with high poverty rates. 
The next set of conditions concerns the relationship between characteristics 
of the resource and the users, including overlap in location between the two, high 
levels of dependence by users on the resource, and sufficiently gradual demand 
growth and technical change to allow emerging institutional arrangements time 
to establish. Upstream-downstream watershed relationships sharply undermine 
the first of these conditions, although less so in smaller microwatersheds where 
at least this relationship may be perceptible and the inhabitants may know each 
other.
Table 1: Factors conducive to emergence of local institutions to manage the commons†
1. Resource system characteristics
a. Small size (W, O)
b. Well-demarcated boundaries (W, O)
c. Low levels of mobility (A)
d. Possibilities of storage of benefits from the resource (A)
e. Predictability (O)
f. Indicators of resource conditions are available at reasonable costs (O ’99) 
g. Traceability of resource improvement to a particular intervention‡
h. Feasibility of improving the resource (O ‘99)
2. Group Characteristics§
a. Small size (W, B&P)
b. Clear boundaries (W)
c. Shared norms (B&P)
d. Trust (O ’99)
e. Past successful/organizational experiences (O ’99)
f. Appropriate leadership (B&P)
g. Interdependence among group members (W, B&P)
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h. Homogeneity of interests (even with diversity of economic and political assets) (O, 
B&P)
i. Low poverty (A)
j. Low discount rate (O ’99)
3. Relationship between resource system and group
a. Overlap between user group residential location and resource location (W, B&P)
b. High levels of dependence by group members on resource system (W)
d. Demand growth and technical change are gradual enough to give emerging institutional 
arrangements time to establish (A)
4. Institutional arrangements
a. Ability to establish favorable institutional arrangements| 
5. External environment
a. Autonomy (W, O ’99)
b. Availability of low cost adjudication (A)
c. Low cost exclusion technology with respect to the external world (A)
e. Supportive external sanctioning institutions (B&P) 
f. Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users for conservation activities 
(B&P)
† Adapted from Agrawal (2001) (A), who drew upon earlier lists by Ostrom (1990) (O), 
Wade (1988) (W), and Baland and Platteau (1996) (B&P). Agrawal (2001) focused on 
factors contributing to sustainable governance rather than emergence of self-organiza-
tion. Ostrom and Wade distinguished between these two sets of factors but Baland and 
Platteau did not. This table includes those factors from Agrawal’s list that are important 
for self-organization and adds others presented by Ostrom (1999).
‡ This factor is specific to watersheds. For example, it needs to be apparent that treating the 
upper watershed influences groundwater availability downstream.
§ Ostrom (1999) also includes low discount rate as an important group characteristic. It is 
excluded here as it is likely to be a function of other included variables such as poverty, 
ability to exclude outsiders, and past experiences with collective action.
| Favorable institutional arrangements that Agrawal mentioned include: a) rules are simple 
and easy to understand (B&P); b) there are locally devised access and management rules 
(W, O, B&P); c) rules are easy to enforce (W, O, B&P); d) there are graduated sanctions 
(W, O); e) low cost adjudication is available (O), f) monitors and other officials are ac-
countable to users (O, B&P), and g) restrictions on harvests match the regenerative ca-
pacity of resources (W, O). Another related factor that Agrawal cited was fairness in the 
allocation of benefits from the common resource (B&P). Agrawal cites these as enabling 
conditions for sustainable governance of the commons. Ability to establish such rules 
rather than their actual existence is the appropriate indicator for a group that is trying to 
develop a collective management system.
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Table 1 also mentions the ability to establish favorable institutional arrange-
ments. Agrawal’s arrangements to facilitate sustainable governance included sim-
ple rules, locally devised access and management rules, ease of enforcing rules, 
graduated sanctions, availability of low-cost adjudication, and accountability of 
monitors and other officials to users. These conditions again show the advantages 
of working in small rather than large watersheds, because rules cannot be simple, 
enforceable, locally devised or easily adjudicated if they cover multiple villages 
in poor communication with one another. Accountability of monitors is a prob-
lem where resources have multiple, conflicting users because monitors may be 
more accountable to one group of users than another. Agrawal also mentioned the 
need to match restrictions on harvest to the regenerative capacity of the resource. 
This brings to mind the observation by Calder et al. (2006) of catchment closure, 
whereby trapping water resources upstream and pumping it heavily prevents its 
regeneration downstream. The problem is that where the microwatershed is the 
management unit, an approach that provides local benefits within the microwa-
tershed may cause harm in other microwatersheds downstream. In other words, 
whereas addressing socioeconomic concerns favors small microwatersheds as the 
unit of operation, addressing this hydrological problem requires working in large 
macrowatersheds and the two may be incompatible.
The final set of enabling conditions in Table 1 concerns the external environ-
ment: autonomy and low-cost exclusion technology with respect to the outside 
world, supportive government, and access to low-cost adjudication. There are 
many examples of all of these factors both favorable and detrimental to successful 
watershed management and often they are beyond local managers’ control.
3.2. Platforms for managing the commons
‘Platforms’ for analysis and negotiation have been discussed in the literature as a 
means to promote collective action on the commons.7 Steins and Edwards (1999a, 
1999b) drew on this idea in an effort to move away from theoretical discussions 
about people’s propensity to work collectively and toward discussions of ap-
proaches to help them do so. They produced a special journal issue to examine 
the use of platforms to manage complex, multiple-use common pool resources 
such as watersheds. They concluded that platforms have great potential to im-
prove commons management, listing several factors that help them work. Table 
2 cites these factors as quoted from the text of their article. They are quite com-
plex and subtle, and it is easy to imagine difficulty in making them work widely. 
The discussion of nested platforms is useful, because microwatersheds each with 
their own platform could be nested within a larger macrowatershed platform, such 
that each platform helps assure that management approaches are compatible both 
7
 In this context, platforms are forums in which diverse stakeholders jointly analyze and negotiate 
diverse interests and develop action plans to solve natural resource management problems.
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within and among microwatersheds. Very few watershed programs in India oper-
ate this way, although the World Bank supported projects are intended to (World 
Bank 2007).
Table 2: Factors associated with effectiveness of nested platforms in governing complex  
common pool resources†
1. It is important that nested platforms‡ correspond with the resource system level that is at 
stake – in ecological, economic, and social terms – and that they are stakeholder-based, 
rather than user-based.§
2. ‘Back up’ by small-scale local platforms can facilitate decision-making and effec tive repre-
sentation in larger-scale nested platforms for collective CPR management. 
3. The empower ment of platform participants to elicit their views is important to challenge in-
equalities (in terms of gender, ethnicity, education, and skills) and domin ant power relations, 
and to create a situation in which communication is as open (and voluntary) as possible. 
4. Stakeholders’ priorities, as well as the resource system, are dynamic and are constantly be-
ing reshaped. Consequently, nested platforms are subject to the same dynamics. 
5. In collective CPR management, social learning about the ecosystem at stake and the differ-
ent stakeholders’ views and actions is vital to agree on action strategies and to break down 
existing power structures that may hinder collective actions. 
6. Platforms for resource use negoti ation are always nested within other decision-making 
structures. The latter influence the role of the nested platform and create the context within 
which new platforms for solving certain resource management problems are necessary or 
redundant. 
7.  A too strong reliance on the formation of nested platforms as the solution to complex re-
source management problem may overshoot the mark; sometimes it can be more effective to 
let platforms evolve from smaller-scale initiatives to tackle the perceived problem. 
8.  There is good reason to believe that the presence of a third party is beneficial to the perform-
ance of nested platforms. 
† Source: Steins and Edwards (1999b). The eight factors assembled in this table are exact 
quotes from the text of the original article. 
‡ ‘Nested platforms’ refers to the fact that decision-making processes take place at multiple 
levels, including the legislative level that sets the legal framework, the collective choice 
level whereby broad rules are made that govern interactions among different organiza-
tions, and the operational level where specific rules are made regarding day-to-day deci-
sions (Steins and Edwards 1999a).
§ Stakeholders are broader than users; they include all those who affect and are affected by 
the resource system.
An important facilitating factor in Table 2 is the presence of a third party facilitator 
to smooth negotiation processes and protect the interests of the weak. Ravnborg 
and Guerrero (1999) particularly stressed this in their study of the role platforms 
play in a watershed management project operated by the International Center for 
Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in Colombia. It appears to further reinforce the argu-
ment that successful watershed management needs to take place on a small scale 
and in a limited number of places so that such facilitation is actually feasible. 
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4. Evolution of Indian watershed projects
This section applies the lessons from theory in the previous section to the experi-
ence of Indian watershed projects. It begins with an overview of the evolution of 
Indian watershed development and a review of project evaluations. It then shows 
how the lessons learned from successive generations of watershed projects are 
consistent with what commons theory would predict. Briefly stated, Indian water-
shed projects began in the 1970s and 1980s with a highly technocratic approach 
that failed to recognize the need to address the challenges of watershed govern-
ance. Since about 1990 projects have taken a more participatory approach that 
focuses more on social organization, but success remains elusive. This is not sur-
prising given the insights from theory introduced in the previous section. 
4.1. Early projects
Early large-scale projects in the 1980s included the World Bank-supported Pilot 
Project on Watershed Development and the Model Watershed Program of the 
Indian Council of Agricultural Research. All of these projects took a purely tech-
nocratic approach as the benefits of watershed development were assumed to be 
self-evident and uncontroversial. The World Bank-supported Pilot Project oper-
ated at a vast scale of tens of thousands of hectares, with little effort to organize 
the inhabitants. Project managers learned the hard way that collective action to 
manage common pool resources was difficult to come by, especially when ben-
efits were gradual, incremental, and unevenly distributed (World Bank 2007). 
4.2. NGO programs
In the late 1980s various Indian NGOs including MYRADA in southern India, 
Social Centre in Maharastha, and the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme in 
Gujarat embarked on watershed development focusing much more on social or-
ganization (Hinchcliffe et al. 1999; Farrington and Lobo 1997). From their per-
spective, watershed technology was fairly straightforward and the real challenge 
was to organize communities to work collectively for successful outcomes. For 
example, MYRADA’s projects focused on identifying separate interest groups 
(low caste people, women, landless, farmers with irrigation, etc.), building their 
organizational capacity and helping them negotiate with one another to ensure 
that watershed investments could satisfy everyone’s interests (Fernandez 1994). 
In fact, MYRADA would not even consider investing in watershed development 
until a village had achieved strong organizational skills. Meanwhile, Social Cen-
tre would begin by identifying villages where topography was favorable for water 
harvesting and where people could show evidence of collective action around 
natural resources. Villagers also had to promise not to plant water intensive crops 
like sugarcane, which would allow a small minority of well-off farmers to capture 
benefits. Many other NGOs operated similar programs. 
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All of the NGO projects worked at a very small scale to facilitate social or-
ganization, with the village- or sub-village watershed as the unit of operation. 
Most of them were not replicated very widely, enabling the NGO to provide close 
supervision.
4.3. New generation government programs
Government programs learned the lessons from their earlier failures and the suc-
cesses of the small NGO programs. New programs in the 1990s aimed to apply 
these lessons.
Integrated Watershed Development Project: The IWDP was initiated in 1990 
with support from the World Bank. This new project was developed at a time 
when the commons literature was blossoming and this helped in understanding the 
problems of the earlier Pilot Project. The project’s supporting documents showed 
links to early attempts by Wade (1988) to identify the conditions associated with 
successful common pool resource management. Project managers in India were 
also strongly influenced by the work of Jodha, who wrote about the reliance of the 
rural poor on common lands and the reasons for their declining area and produc-
tivity (for a summary see Jodha 1992).
The IWDP still operated in very large watersheds covering tens of thousands 
of hectares, but for operational purposes they were divided into smaller microwa-
tersheds with more distinguishable boundaries. User committees were established 
to represent different interest groups in the watersheds and were given certain 
powers to make rules; systems of graduated sanctions were established based on 
traditional institutions; monitoring systems were established; etc. The new in-
stitutions were established on a weak footing, however. Committees sometimes 
existed in name only, monitoring systems were propped up by project funds, and 
people agreed to things apparently just to gain project funds (Kerr and Pender 
1996). Of course these are typical problems facing heavily funded development 
projects but they demonstrated why Ostrom’s (1990) principles cannot be used as 
a blueprint.8
Ministry of Rural Development: The Ministry radically redesigned its water-
shed projects based on an advisory committee’s recommendations in 1994 (Gov-
ernment of India 1994). These projects became the centerpiece of government ru-
ral development efforts in semiarid, unirrigated areas. The 1994 Guidelines drew 
heavily on the experiences of NGOs like MYRADA, operating at village-level 
microwatersheds as the new unit of implementation, devoting attention to par-
ticipation, and endorsing indigenous practices and management systems. NGOs 
became eligible to implement these projects. 
Government-NGO collaborative programs in Maharashtra: In the mid-1990s, 
two new programs aimed to combine the technical expertise of government agen-
8
 Ostrom regularly points out that the design principles must not be treated as a blueprint but her 
warning often seems to be ignored.
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cies and social organization skills of NGOs. The Indo-German Watershed De-
velopment Programme (IGWDP) followed the model of Social Centre described 
above, and the Adarsh Gaon Yojana (AGY) followed the approach taken by Mr. 
Anna Hazare of Ralegaon Siddhi, site of the most successful watershed project in 
Maharashtra (Kerr et al. 2002). Hazare, one of India’s best known social activists, 
believed that successful village-level watershed management required practical 
steps to protect the natural resource base and a commitment to personal responsi-
bility. Accordingly, to be eligible for the AGY, a village had to ban open grazing 
and tree-cutting in upper watershed pastures, engage in group labor (shramdan) 
for the benefit of the village as a whole, forego alcohol consumption, and practice 
family planning. To be eligible for the IGWDP, villages had to demonstrate the 
capacity for collective action and agree not to grow water intensive crops like 
sugarcane.
4.4. Evaluations of Indian Watershed Projects
There have been a number of evaluations of Indian watershed projects over the 
years but very few compared different approaches or tried to correct for selection 
bias. Among the individual evaluations there appears to be an overrepresentation 
of well-known, highly supervised projects known to be successful. This was the 
case for a special edition of the Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics (1991) 
and a set of self-evaluations of participatory projects reported in Hinchcliffe et 
al. (1999), for example. Overrepresentation of successful cases often stems from 
implementing agencies aiming to promote their work and data sets being more 
available for heavily supervised projects with large budgets. Ratna Reddy et al. 
(2004) purposely selected success stories in an evaluation of the Ministry of Rural 
Development projects in order to assess the potential for successful watershed 
development to improve rural livelihoods. 
Joshi et al. (2005) conducted a meta analysis of 311 evaluations that estimated 
benefit-cost ratios of watershed projects, based on all available studies. Presum-
ably the success stories are also overrepresented in this work.
Kerr et al. (2002) randomly selected 86 villages in Maharashtra and Andhra 
Pradesh to compare the performance of first-generation government watershed 
projects with a technical orientation, NGO projects focusing on social organiza-
tion, and the two NGO-government collaborative projects described above. This 
study tried to correct for selection bias.
As mentioned, Batchelor et al. (2003) found that successful water harvesting 
in upper watersheds came at the expense of lower watershed areas due to catch-
ment closure after heavy pumping in upper watersheds.
Most evaluations are favorable. The early evaluations of heavily supervised 
projects showed impressive results, as did the self-assessments in Hinchcliffe et 
al. (1999). Ratna Reddy et al. (2004) found only modest impacts on livelihoods. 
Joshi et al. (2005) found a mean benefit cost ratio of 2.14 in their meta-analysis, 
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with stronger performance in more participatory projects than more technocratic 
ones. Joshi et al. expressed surprise at finding projects covering more than 1250 
hectares performing stronger than those covering less than 1250 hectares. Howev-
er, the 1250 hectare cutoff is not very useful for assessing the impact of watershed 
size on performance. The more important distinction is whether the watershed 
covers more than one village, because village-level watersheds are still part of a 
natural social unit. In the study by Kerr et al. (2002), 39 out of 86 villages exceed-
ed 1250 hectares, so the 1250 hectare dividing line does not address this issue.
Kerr et al. (2002) found that NGO-government collaborative projects per-
formed the best, followed by purely NGO projects and lastly by the first gen-
eration government projects. The projects with an NGO component had a strong 
social organization focus that dealt specifically with the uneven distribution of 
benefits and costs, and they operated in smaller watersheds within a single vil-
lage. On the other hand, government projects were solely technocratic, and the 
one government project that operated in multiple-village watersheds performed 
the worst. The successes by the projects with an NGO component came in the 
form of reduced soil erosion, higher crop income, improved management of com-
mon pastures, more employment, and increased irrigation. The authors cautioned 
that the successful cases were consistently in small microwatersheds and did not 
operate widely, with no evidence they could replicate substantially or operate in 
higher scale watersheds. 
4.5. Discussion
Indian watershed projects evolved from the mid-1980s to the present by gradu-
ally intensifying their focus on participation and social organization while also 
reducing their size. These shifts resulted mainly from the demonstration effects of 
early NGO projects but in some cases with influence from the literature on com-
munity-based natural resource management. In many respects the changes from 
large to small and from technocratic to participatory reflect the factors believed to 
facilitate the emergence of local institutions to manage the commons. It is more 
likely that the experience of the Indian watershed projects helps to validate those 
factors, and less likely that the literature guided the Indian projects, with perhaps 
some iteration between the two. The NGOs likely identified the advantages of a 
participatory approach simply through their experiences on the ground.9 Some 
larger projects like those supported by the World Bank drew both on the experi-
ences of successful NGOs and on the literature, which tended to reinforce each 
other. 
Although the watershed literature frequently cites studies of the commons to 
explain the need for social organization efforts, it is conspicuously silent about the 
9
 In some cases NGOs documented their experiences. See for example the many reports by 
MYRADA (www.myrada.org) and Seva Mandir (www.sevamandir.org).
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mismatch between characteristics of watersheds and the factors believed to con-
tribute to successful commons management. An exception is Ravnborg (2000), 
who commented that had she paid attention to Ostrom’s design principles, she 
never would have undertaken the CIAT watershed project in Colombia. This 
would have resulted in one less successful watershed project. On the other hand, 
because it operated on a tiny scale with intensive external assistance that cannot 
be replicated widely, that success may be an exception that proves the rule.10
Successful watershed projects have beaten the odds by overcoming inherent 
constraints to collective action, but they have not surmounted two remaining ob-
stacles. First, projects with high investment in social organization may not be 
replicable beyond a small number of cases. Second, operating on the basis of 
a workable social unit (a village microwatershed rather than a macrowatershed 
that crosses administrative boundaries) apparently trades one set of problems for 
another.
Regarding the first problem of constraints to replication, there is little evidence 
that very successful projects have replicated beyond a few villages. Even those 
that have successfully expanded their operations reveal major limitations. For 
example, the IGWDP undertook a systematic approach to replication and after 12 
years its successful village level projects number in the hundreds, but it works in 
an area with tens of thousands of villages. The IGWDP’s deliberate approach has 
yielded strong performance, in sharp contrast to government projects with much 
wider coverage (Kerr et al. 2002). 
Although wide replication, or ‘scaling up’, appears to be the Holy Grail for 
projects designed to elicit social change, there are many reasons why it is not a 
realistic goal. Manski (1995), for example, points out that the conditions of a pilot 
project will not likely be replicated exactly in other sites, because conditions will 
differ. Similarly, a pilot project is likely to be carried out differently than the scaled 
up version, even with identical design, because a larger effort may affect market 
wages or strain the supply of competent program administrators. Project outputs 
also may change when a project expands, for example if a market saturates. For 
watersheds, catchment closure becomes a more serious problem as watershed de-
velopment expands because it induces greater pumping of groundwater.
The big question concerning the tradeoff between operating at an optimal hy-
drological unit versus an optimal social unit is its severity. In the early days of 
watershed projects, ignoring the optimal social unit resulted in failure because 
projects could not achieve effective watershed governance. More recently, the 
10
 The CIAT watershed covered about 7000 hectares with about 1100 inhabitants scattered in 23 
villages. Based on previous experience and literature on collective action, the CIAT team chose to 
work with small groups of 30-40 families covering about 200 ha subwatersheds to address natural 
resource management problems. Through a long process, the subwatershed groups gradually 
developed platforms for diverse stakeholders to jointly analyze and negotiate diverse interests and 
develop action plans to manage natural resources. CIAT acted as facilitator (Ravnborg and Guerrero 
1999).
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pendulum has swung in the opposite direction and most projects operate at the vil-
lage level, disregarding hydrological linkages between microwatersheds. Catch-
ment closure has emerged in part by ignoring these linkages, and it shows the 
need to address them by working at a macrowatershed scale. However, such an 
approach is incompatible with the strategy made successful by the IGWDP of in-
vesting exclusively in separate microwatersheds where water harvesting potential 
is high and communities have demonstrated the ability to work collectively.
5. Implications for policy and practice
The best watershed management approach certainly depends upon the situation 
and objectives. Some possibilities are: 1) stay small and give up on complex, 
higher scale watershed management; and 2) build capacity for higher scale water-
shed management through improved institutional arrangements and improved 
technologies.
5.1. Give up scaling attempts and accept a smaller impact
Theory and experience have shown that collective action is more likely in small, 
village-level watersheds, and that project agencies can best facilitate watershed 
management if they work in a small number of locations. The IGWDP follows 
these principles, working only where it perceives a high probability of success. It 
is important to recognize that this approach does not discriminate against villages 
deemed poor candidates. First, being bypassed by a project that would not work 
is no great loss, and second, rural areas of developing countries have many other 
needs besides watershed development. For example, survey respondents in India 
expressed strong preference for investments in medical facilities, roads, latrines, 
and other infrastructure as opposed to watershed development (Kerr et al. 2002). 
In an era of decentralization, people should be able to choose between watershed 
and other investments like infrastructure and government services.
A United States Forest Service watershed program aiming to reduce nonpoint 
source water pollution learned similar lessons about the need to prioritize its work, 
as success in individual project sites correlated closely to local civic capacity. An 
evaluation by Doppelt et al. (2002) recommended focusing the watershed projects 
in areas with high civic capacity while investing in such capacity elsewhere.11 For 
MYRADA, whose programs were described in section 4.2, not only was build-
ing local organizational capacity critical for watershed management, but an ini-
tial capacity building investment led to numerous other economic opportunities 
(Fernandez 1994).
11
 Doppelt et al. (2002) define civic capacity in terms of social capital, community competence , and 
civic enterprise. They do not suggest a means of easily identifying civic capacity before starting a 
project apart from assessing it through interactions with pertinent groups such as local government 
and nonprofit organizations. The Indo-German Watershed Development Programme and the Adarsh 
Gaon Yojana in Maharashtra, India, discussed above, also selected their project villages on the basis 
of civic capacity, defined in terms of demonstrating the ability to self-impose and abide by certain 
rules of collective restraint prior to investing in a new project (Kerr et al. 2002).
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In India, the recommendation of staying small is futile because the Indian 
government aims to expand watershed development as widely as possible. Other 
recommendations are needed.
5.2. Build capacity to operate at macrowatershed scales
Research has shown that the microwatershed approach may be creating hydro-
logical problems that would be best addressed by operating at a macrowatershed 
scale. This would require working simultaneously to promote watershed govern-
ance capacity both within and between microwatersheds.
Within microwatersheds, this calls for continuing to build organizational, ad-
ministrative, and governance skills at local levels as mentioned above. For exam-
ple, very little of MYRADA’s approach to watershed management seems to be 
about watersheds, reflecting its conviction that strong organizational capacity is 
the most critical ingredient (Fernandez 1994). Such capacity is needed to bring 
together stakeholders with conflicting interests, design workable compromises, 
and put them to work. Better governance may help in enforcing whatever agree-
ments can be developed.
At the macrowatershed scale, new institutional arrangements are needed to 
promote interaction among microwatershed groups within large macrowater-
sheds, as described in section 4.5 above. This would involve developing some-
thing like a ‘nested platforms’ approach at a macrowatershed scale. It could in-
volve specific mechanisms to facilitate the interaction such as new legislation 
or new arrangements for sharing upstream-downstream costs and benefits. The 
CGIAR’s SCALES project aims to build cross-scale institutional mechanisms for 
watershed management, addressing village- and basin-level interaction (Swallow 
et al. 2005).
Macrowatershed management could also benefit from improved technology 
to understand and track upstream-downstream relationships. Technologies that 
could track hydrological relationships and trace impacts of natural resource use 
in one location on another would open new possibilities for developing indicators 
and monitoring systems to facilitate management. If such technologies seem like 
a fantasy, consider that remote sensing and GIS have revolutionized research on 
land use and land cover change, laying the groundwork for various complex insti-
tutional arrangements such as global markets for carbon sequestration. 
On a less futuristic level, Calder et al. (2006) shows how EXCLAIM, an ex-
isting simulation model with a visual interface, can model hydrological relation-
ships to visually demonstrate upstream-downstream relationships and the spatial 
effects of management changes.
5.3. A final word
Commons research emerged in the 1980s in response to the incorrect presump-
tion that the tragedy of the commons was inevitable. Commons researchers do 
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not imagine that all commons can be well-managed, yet watershed projects are 
organized as if this were so, with most watershed agencies aiming to spread their 
projects as widely as possible despite unfavorable conditions for collective action. 
It is as useful for commons research to point out the limits of common property 
resource management as to highlight its potential. 
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